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Introduction 
 
The concept of “organisational resilience” stirs real interest amongst risk management 
researchers. It is derived from the generalisation of the concept of resilience in psychology, 
referring to “a fundamental quality of individuals, groups, organizations and systems as a 
whole to respond productively to a significant change that disrupts the expected pattern of 
events without engaging in an extended period of regressive behaviour” (Horne and Orr, 
1998). 
 
The concept of “organisational resilience” recognises that risk control depends on the 
capacity of an organisation to take account of “irregular variations, disruptions and 
degradation of expected working conditions” (Hollnagel, Leveson and Woods, 2005, Woods 
2005), or the organisation’s skills in « managing the unexpected » (Weick and Sutcliff, 2001). 
Thus, “a high reliability organization is one that exhibits resilience, among other qualities, in 
the face of unanticipated occurrences” (Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003). The “resilient 
organisation” works a bit like a reed in bad weather: it bends but doesn’t break, whilst a tree, 
which is more rigid, would have broken. It is possible to register several degrees of resilience 
according to the definition that we give to “unexpected occurrences”: they may be 
unforeseen aspects of the activity (Hollnagel, Leveson and Woods, 2005), unexpected 
situations or a major crisis affecting the organisation, including an element of trauma 
(Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003). Capacities which count for resilience are generally those 
associated with forward planning, perception and reaction to variations (Hollnagel, Leveson 
and Woods, 2005), the ability to interpret events, manage complexities, improvise, redefine 
roles, immediately correct errors and learn from them (Weick and Sutcliff, 2001). Resilience 
also uses redundant resources, “organisational slack” (Woods, 2005) and the redistribution 
of technical competences within the organisation on account, amongst other things, of the 
mobility of its people (Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003). 
 
Our paper proposes discussion of organisational resilience in the case of a project to add a 
new automation system to highly reliable, complex operational systems. Adding new 
technology to an existing system generally poses unexpected interface and technical 
complexity problems which can have different types of impacts which can disorganise a 
project. Furthermore, the automation introduced new tight couplings (Perrow, 1986), bringing 
unexpected sequences and interactions, potential sources of major dysfunction (Perrow, 
1999, Wolf and Berniker, 1999).  
 
The combination of technologies introduces numerous unforeseen technical outcomes into 
the design activity. These technical outcomes and their resolution can take on unexpected 
proportions, both in terms of complexity and number and, in turn, lead to a variety of 
uncertainties. Atkinson et al. (2006) categorise uncertainties in projects into three groups: 
“uncertainty associated with estimating” (lack of experience in a given area, unclear 
specifications, interdependency between activities, unexpected occurrences during the 
project), “uncertainty associated with projects parties” (motivation of different parties, 
perception of objectives and risks, the skills of each party), “uncertainty associated with the 
stages in the project life-cycle” (design changes, planning changes). The more complex the 
system combining existing and new technologies, the more complex the design and 
development work will be: designers realise that there are incompatibilities between their 
design choices once the project has begun, trials show that the expected level of 
performance is not being achieved, unexpected outcomes will propagate from team to team 
in an unexpected manner (Aggeri, Segrestin, 2002). 
  
The coordination of tasks and project members is subject to permanent readjustments 
“because the numerous interconnected and sequential tasks involved in the project will not 
automatically organise themselves into appropriate action and time sequences” (Strauss, 
1985). Unexpected outcomes disrupt the work of teams (Atkinson et al, 2006) and provoke 
work overloads which are difficult to manage safely within the project’s deadline and 
resource limitations. 
 
This coordination is based on formal mechanisms but also on informal exchanges which 
allow the work to be organised (Strauss, 1985). During the project, the different actors 
negotiate, persuade, make arrangements and more or less “tacit understandings” in order to 
rank priorities, resolve time-related conflicts and finally construct a “negotiated order” 
(Strauss, 1988). Negotiations will encompass the meanings of actors, their tasks, 
responsibilities, obligations, commitments, conceptual structures and time-related issues 
(Hampson and Junor, 2005). This is not decided in advance and in a vast project 
organisation, coordination can be severely affected by the division of work, the tendency to 
depersonalise relationships as well as physical distance or competition between 
occupational groups. Ethnographic studies (Star, 1989; Wenger, 1998; Strauss, 1988) have 
clearly shown the extent to which cooperation between members belonging to different 
“social worlds” or “communities of practice” can be difficult and will substantially influence the 
direction a project takes. 
 
Several of the origins of these tensions and “misunderstandings” have been identified: a high 
degree of bureaucratic partitioning; highly specialised knowledge which is difficult to transfer 
(Carlile, 2004); spatial difference (Metiu, 2004); the lack of shared objectives and meanings 
(Star, 1989); the existence of divergent interests (Metiu, 2004); identity-related issues 
(Wenger, 2003; Mork and ali. 2008). A substantial body of literature has advanced ways in 
which differences can be overcome, notably through the construction of artefacts or 
boundary objects (Star, 1989; Carlile, 2004). But as Mork and ali (2008) emphasise, the 
analysis of “discontinuities between occupational communities” and their impact on projects 
still has a lot to teach us. Technological innovation projects can lead to redefinitions of 
occupational territories (Abbott, 1988; Mork and ali, 2008; Bechky, 2002) questioning roles, 
identities and statuses of certain groups within the organisation (Metiu, 2004), leading to 
deliberate obstacles to cooperation (development of opacity, intra-organisational 
competition), obstacles in the management of unforeseen outcomes and absence of formal 
and informal regulation between the different teams.  
 
We have carried out an in-depth analysis of several major incidents caused by errors made 
during technical modifications to a operating rail system as part of a major modernisation 
project. An ethnographical study at the heart of this project organisation has allowed us to 
consolidate our analysis of organisational factors which degrade reliability. The situations are 
particularly critical because the modernisation project – and in this case, automation – 
concerns infrastructures which are used each day for passenger transport.  
 
Modifications are progressively introduced during operational downtime, in other words at 
night, and the infrastructure has to be working again next morning, with maximum reliability. 
 
Guaranteeing the reliability of a given project organisation would require increasing that 
organisation’s ability to adapt to unforeseen outcomes, in other words, its capacity for 
resilience. But, referring to the notion of resilience for project organisation carries with it a 
high degree of ambiguity. Indeed, this notion encourages adaptation capacities: “by making 
critical adjustments in a timely manner, business organizations are better able to manage 
the unexpected” (Weick, 2001). However, it does not really question the limits to adaptation 
and the maximum pressure of unforeseen outcomes that a project or team can handle 
without degrading reliability. We might ask the question as to whether there is not an 
acceptable level of unforeseen outcomes beyond which resilience is no longer present, 
exposing the project to risks of error or technical dysfunctions which result in deviation from 
reliability objectives. What is true for a project is even more so for the different teams 
working within it. To what extent is the flexibility shared and negotiated? Is it based on 
regular re-framing exchanges between the teams? Insisting too much on reactivity within a 
project brings with it the risk of encouraging certain teams to accept an excessive workload 
and short-circuiting formal or informal redundancies which, until now, allowed them to 
guarantee the high level of security required. Guaranteeing the reliability of a project 
organisation would therefore mean preventing, limiting or regulating unforeseen outcomes 
that each team within the project would be required and able to absorb and thus avoiding 
deviances (Vaughan, 1999) towards an excessive acceptation of unforeseen outcomes that 
it would not be able to manage. 
  
The context: a project for the automation of existing equipment 
 The rail transport company where this research was carried out is currently undergoing a 
major equipment renewal phase. The equipment has aged, in particular on account of much 
heavier traffic than planned and, in some cases, even become obsolete. In some cases, very 
substantial modernisation works have been decided. Also, a serious accident - a derailment 
10 or so years ago - showed the urgency of pushing ahead with renewal. 
 
This gave rise to a concomitant launch of several major projects affecting more than half of 
the network’s lines, designed to provide a safer but also more efficient transport system, 
whilst reducing the intervals between trains to increase transport capacity. 
 
These projects target primarily the automation of train-driving systems. This means replacing 
old automation systems by new, computerised ones. In order to ensure efficient, completely 
safe services, these new automation systems are interfaced with large amounts of older 
equipment, such as electro-mechanical signalling equipment (detection of trains and 
information from the control room and from other drivers, etc….). 
A very large diversity of technical skills in play 
The need to manage numerous automation projects at once led to the creation of a new 
engineering unit bringing together skill sets which, until then, had been dispersed: 
automation engineers, signalling engineers and railway engineers. Project teams were 
created, made up solely of automation engineers; they took over project management, 
including budgets and the deadlines, piloting sub-contractors and development of the project 
and work with signalling engineering and rail engineering departments. These departments 
are structured by functions which correspond to the different project phases: specification 
design, testing and implementation. Thus, the project organisation is required to work with a 
dual segmentation of tasks; segmentation by technical field (automation, electro-mechanics, 
etc…) and functional segmentation within. 
 
The project is divided up into different stages which can run sequentially or in concomitantly. 
This temporal organisation is included in the schedule formalised by the project team. 
Considerable economic, technical and safety issues 
These projects include many challenges for the company investigated: they represent major 
budgets and it is difficult to extend deadlines beyond the dates initially fixed. They engage 
new technologies which have not always yet been designed and have never previously been 
in operation. The project team cannot really depend on any real past experience, and not all 
can be defined or planned beforehand, which makes scheduling very difficult. 
 
However, modifying equipment dedicated to safety presents two key risks: technical 
incoherence and error. There is a risk of technical incoherence on account of the technical 
interfaces involved: between signalling and automation or between signalling engineering 
and contractors. It is important to ensure that the modifications are inter-compatible and that 
a modification to one part of the system will not compromise the operation of another. 
Coordination between technical specialities is therefore crucial in order to prevent this sort of 
risk. There is also a risk of errors, both in terms of design (an error which has slipped into the 
drawings) and implementation (cabling errors, for example). 
 The conditions under which these modifications are implemented increase the risks 
associated with those operations. In this case, work on existing installations which are 
actually in operation. The phasing of operations is therefore very important: throughout the 
period of the project (several years), partial modifications will be made almost nightly, to very 
tight deadlines (between 3 and 4 hours), tested and checked before services start up again 
at 5 o’clock in the morning. After the works, the system must therefore be perfectly safe, but 
also ready for operation. Several technical configurations (old and new) will coexist during 
relatively long periods and that must not impact operations: the trains continue to carry 
passengers. 
 
Incidents 
 
In the night of February 14th to 15th 20061, modification works to signalling equipment were 
carried out at station “X” on the red line. The objective was to run installation tests on a new 
switching system, involving a change in the signalling logic: it meant checking that the 
signals matched with the position of the switch (left or right) i.e. that they pointed the train in 
the right direction. During the whole of the night, the workers had to deal with different 
dysfunctionings which they managed to solve. At 4.35am the trials were completed. At 
4.55am the equipment and workers returned to the station: no-one was now on the tracks. At 
5.10am, the final tests were carried out remotely, from the station: the situation was 
considered normal. At 5.45am, the workers, who were still in the station, were informed of a 
problem with the switch signal: the signal was green and therefore the driver was authorised 
to go through it, even though he would be going in the wrong direction. The workers return 
immediately to the signal and observed an oversight in the reopening of the electrical supply 
controlling the signal, i.e. the system was still in project configuration. After corrective work, a 
further test was carried out: the situation was now normal, and the workers left the station. 
The green signal authorised the driver to go onto a track where another train was stationary. 
A train crash was narrowly avoided ! 
 
In the night of April 17th to 18th, works and tests were carried out at station “Y” on the red 
line. Only sub-contractors were present and the modifications carried out were considered 
minor and without any operational incidence. This work was completed during the night of 
April 18th to 19th. At 6am, after the test passage of two trains (to ensure that no anomalies 
occurred), as required by the regulations, the sub-contractors called the company to inform 
them of the post-work situation. The conclusion was clear: “nothing to report”. At 11.16am, 
the signalling engineering group was informed of a signalling anomaly at station “Y”, which 
suggested an “absence”: the train at the station disappeared, virtually: it was no longer 
electrically detected and therefore the signals intended to protect it stayed green and the 
central control tower did not see them. There was nothing to stop a train positioned behind it 
from moving forward … and hitting the “ghost train”. The seriousness of the situation was 
assessed immediately and all traffic was stopped. The work carried out on the previous 
nights was thought to be the root cause. The signalling project manager responsible for this 
operation went to the area in which the dysfunction happened and informed the sub-
contractor of the situation, who also turned up at the site. Together, they checked all the 
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 For reasons of confidentiality, the dates of the incidents as well as their locations have been 
modified. However, the intervals between these incidents have been respected. 
plans concerning the modification carried out the previous nights: they then realise that this 
modification had a functional impact on signalling logic which was not spotted at the time of 
the design and verification process. They therefore made modifications to the equipment to 
secure zone temporarily. At 3.25pm, the situation was back to normal: traffic could re-start. 
The signalling workers had to review all the designs in order to secure this zone on a 
permanent basis. Once again, a train crash was only just averted, and traffic was stopped for 
4 hours. 
 
These two incidents were particularly serious and occurred just several months apart. The 
signalling engineering team was shaken by the sequence of events and questioned its 
capacity to control the risks linked to modifications being carried out on a very large number 
of points on the network. The fallout went beyond this occupational community: the directors 
of the technical and operating units demanded explanations. Enquiries were launched, 
workers held responsible and possible sanctions mentioned. It is in this context that our 
research work begins.  
 
These incidents attract our attention from a number of angles. They are all linked to works to 
modify signalling equipment which are part of these vast projects to which we referred. The 
first incident shows a lack of vigilance of the modification operations and a certain weariness 
of designers-checkers. The second incident is more to do with design, typical of a complex 
system: the modification carried out had unexpected impacts on other systems. 
 
Very quickly, an initial causal analysis brought to light the fact that the incidents occurred in a 
high-pressure production context particularly due to the deadlines of the different projects. 
The formal validation processes for the design and implementation plans, based on dual 
controls (i.e. organisational redundancy), would appear not to have ensured the reliability of 
the operations carried out on those nights. Finally, the workers involved in these incidents 
were mostly experienced and considered highly competent within their own occupational 
community.  
 
Research methodology 
 
So as to address organisational resilience, it is important to understand where the 
“unexpected occurrences” came from and how they were addressed by the different 
members of a socially-organised unit (Vaughan, 1999). The mistakes, misconducts or 
disasters were produced within and by the organisation (Vaughan, 1999), and therefore our 
attention is drawn to the characteristics of the organisation itself both in terms of structure 
and process or indeed tasks: organisation redundancy, formalisation, centralisation or 
decentralisation, occupational groups (Vaughan, 1997). 
 
In the case in point, it is important to understand in detail the organisation of a project. As 
Strauss points out (1988), “the organisation of the project influences the probability that 
disruption interactional alignment2 will occur and affects the severity, the duration, the 
strategies used to overcome it and the impact on other aspects of project work”. In other 
words, the organisation of a project impacts the degree of organisational resilience, i.e. the 
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 Process by which workers fit together their respective work-related actions (Corpin and Strauss, 
1988). 
capacity of actors to bounce back, faced with unexpected occurrences, and get back to a 
state of equilibrium. 
 
So as to carry out our research effectively, we started by listening to feedback and other 
incident reports and analyses so as to familiarise ourselves with the analysis and event 
processing methodology used by the organisation in question. We also wanted to 
understand what the analysis involved, with whom the results were shared, what the attitude 
of the organisation – and its management in particular – was in relation to these incidents. 
Finally, we were given access to the causes identified by the actors of the organisation 
themselves.  
 
We then carried out 50 or so interviews which were recorded and transcribed with the 
different parties involved in the project: members of the project team, two contractors, the 
signalling engineering department (engineers or technicians, including the head of this 
group, supervisors, verifiers and designers) and those working on the tracks (engineers or 
technicians). These interviews were then subject to in-depth analysis: we were looking to 
identify the themes cited from within the different technical specialities, identify any 
divergences in the way in which these themes were addressed and finally, associate the 
two. Extracts of interviews illustrating the aspects cited by the different technical specialities 
are presented in the results. 
 
We began by talking to the signalling engineering team. In these interviews, we questioned 
the actors about the activities involved in their daily work, the different tasks that they had to 
accomplish and the way in which they went about doing so. We completed these interviews 
with field observation. This provided us with precious information on the way the work was 
actually done, on the contingencies which could disrupt working activities, but also on key 
actors who bear much of the burden of managing unexpected occurrences.  
 
Rail signalling engineering has always been the case that they play a crucial role in rail 
safety: the team is not just an appendix to the system. Thus, studying the working activities 
of “signalling engineering” workers gives us crucial insight into how risks are perceived and 
controlled at their level, within the framework of their tasks, but also how these risks are 
assessed and negotiated with the other working groups, i.e. the project teams which set 
system characteristics, budgets and schedules. 
 
We then worked our way up the modification request chain, up to the members of the project 
teams. With them, our questions primarily concerned the existing organisation, the formally 
defined roles of the different individuals and the documents which accompany their work 
activities.  
 
Our purpose was to identify whether negotiations and adjustments of deadlines were routine 
or not, if the combination of events which had led to the dysfunctionings observed might be 
reproduced or not. It was also about examining whether the formal structures of the 
organisation (breaking off into teams, sub-contractor relations, different technical skills, 
etc…) made the adjustment processes easier or more difficult (A. Strauss, 1988) and 
participated in the propagation and transformation of constraints, allowed the solving of 
complex problems. We demonstrated the scope of organisational flexibility, but also 
elements of rigidity and thus explained the accumulation of constraints in certain areas of the 
organisation. 
 
Results 
 
Degrading of “communities of practices” responsible for “older 
technologies” limits the overlapping of competences required to 
achieve reliability 
 
Woods (2005) and Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) emphasise that the overlapping of 
competences is a contributor to an organisation’s capacity for resilience. We shall examine 
how each technical speciality and, in particular, signalling engineering, functions as a 
“community of practices” (Wenger, 1998); overlapping of competencies, transfer of know-
how, mutual aid and mutual control. 
 
In theory, error-free, reliable signalling modification operations require a formal control 
process called “dual verification”. This means that any document (drawing, plan, 
specification, test logs) will be checked twice: once by a person from the group having 
created the document and a second time by a person from the group working downstream 
on the them in the modification chain. Thus, the design plan will be verified by a person from 
the implementation group, the implementation plan prepared by a sub-contractor will be 
checked by a person from the implementation group. Checks are documented in “opinion 
forms” in which any errors and modifications to be made to the document are entered. At the 
end of this process, the document is validated. 
 
As defined formally, the two checks are supposedly independent, i.e. the actors are not 
supposed to have any exchange outside the opinion forms.  
 
Once all the necessary documents have been validated, the work phase begins, during 
which the equipment is modified, followed by the test phase where checks are made to 
ensure the modifications allow the installations to function properly and safely. 
 
Within the signalling engineers group there is a division of work between functions, mostly 
according to type of project (specifications, design, implementation). In terms of 
implementation, the activities are divided up between workers from the company and sub-
contractors: some of the work is indeed sub-contracted, although a representative of the 
company will be present in a supervisory capacity. 
 
Furthermore, signalling engineering requires very specific, very sophisticated skills. Apart 
from the technical signalling logic knowledge (electro-mechanical technology), it is very 
important to have a clear understanding of existing equipment and their specificities. The 
task also requires high capacities for concentration and vigilance (Vaughan, 1997), 
throughout the modification management process: verification of plans, cabling of equipment 
installed and technical tests. Teamwork therefore plays a crucial role in the development of 
“mindfulness” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001) throughout the modification management process. 
 “We need to have a different perspective because it is true that when we are involved in a 
project over many months, our objectivity is affected. Therefore, the fact of having an 
outsider taking a different perspective gives rise to auto-criticism. Finally, more or less all of 
us tend to end up putting objectivity back on the rails. It gets us to check with each other. For 
big projects, it’s crucial.” 
 
Thus, the most experienced members have learnt to be sceptical of dual verification and test 
logs: it is not because there is dual verification that the design work is flawless. On account 
of this, nothing totally guarantees that the test log - created from implementation plans - 
contains no errors or covers absolutely every angle. 
 
In the same way, formal documents (procedures, rail regulations) supply very little 
information on the precise nature of the tasks to be carried out on account of their very 
general nature. This is also explained by the fact that signalling equipment is not generic and 
therefore it is impossible to prescribe precise operating procedures. For each area of the 
network there is different equipment, depending on the network’s age, the equipment used, 
etc…Competence is based on a keen knowledge of different installations and the capacity to 
adapt to the associated specificities and risks. 
 
So, in spite of the formal processes and division of work, we observe a certain level of 
flexibility, but also a relatively shared and coherent vision of the work to be done and 
methods to be used. On top of the formal double-check procedures, there are of course less 
formal forms of doubling up: each person involved, when they have the necessary skills, will, 
when they carry out their part of the task, re-check whether the previous task has been done 
correctly. 
 
“This is unquestionably a relatively complicated area and when we are working alone, it is 
not easy. We need to be able to sound out those around us. There are areas like that where 
being alone is not a good thing. You need to be able to ask questions around you on areas 
which seem a little complex to us, where we may have difficulties… It’s good to be able to go 
and knock on someone’s door and get a different perspective”. 
 
Whilst certain actors are formally entrusted with coordinating specific aspects of a project, 
they are far from being the only ones to play this coordination role. Everyone, more or less 
discretely, seeks to inter-connect the work, “hold together” its different aspects (Strauss, 
1988). More than the formal dual verification procedure, risk control is primarily dependant 
upon adjustments, understandings and informal arrangements between signalling engineers, 
but also with sub-contractors doing signalling works. The designers will talk about plans 
face-to-face, or go onto the night shift with partially-modified documents, with the intention of 
checking certain points directly when they get to the site. 
 
These adjustments also allow the construction of collective competencies. It is a fact that 
informal regulation encourages workers to exchange and talk about their problems and 
difficulties (within the occupational community) and divide out the tasks, depending on 
competencies, with each technician not necessarily having the same experience of the 
technology, or the same knowledge of the sections of track impacted by the modification… 
Faced with dead-ends, the technicians will talk to each other. 
 “When we have a problem, we go and see whether someone else has come across it or 
whether someone has an answer. Even if it’s someone who is not working on it, we can ask 
all the same. We manage our own activity, but we can ask questions if we have such-and-
such a concern. (…) our offices are all close to each other and so, very often, when we 
come across a problem in our work, something which seems odd, somebody will say to us 
“yes…I’ve seen that, that happened to me”.  
 
So, problems can “migrate” within the team, from the requester to the most experienced and 
the most competent member. We observe what Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) call “deference to 
expertise”, typical of Highly Reliable Organisations: it is the most competent person faced 
with the given problem at local level who is authorised to take a decision. This not only 
allows a solution to be found to the problem very possible, but also strengthens occupational 
group cohesion, and improves knowledge and practical know-how within the signalling team.  
 
However, signalling engineering has undergone major changes in the make-up of its teams. 
With the arrival of young, less experienced technicians, a new division of work and 
competencies has arisen. Whilst before, the designers also piloted works, today this task is 
the responsibility of the project manager who sub-contracts implementation. The young 
engineers who have become the main interfaces between design and work do not have the 
same level of technical competencies and cannot understand and check the work of the 
designer-verifiers. 
 
“People come and work here with their BTS (BAC +2 in electro-mechanics) and we let them 
loose on these projects; you have to believe me, it’s complicated ! It’s said that it takes 
between 5 and 10 years to understand signalling. And even after 20 years, we don’t know 
everything, and we can all make mistakes”.  
 
“Training in the past was based on apprenticeship, and we had much more time; we could 
double people up take them to the work sites during the day, during the night. (…) but all that 
has gone and it’s a real pity, because that’s where we learnt the most”. 
 
For major projects, the type of training favoured in the past (i.e. apprenticeship) has largely 
been abandoned on account of limited available resources. Young people only receive 
theoretical training and are sent onto projects as soon as possible. Finally, design and 
verification operations on plans are increasingly the domain of a handful of people (the most 
experienced). Thus, informal redundancy based on the overlapping of competencies 
between all workers no longer really exists. It is more a one-way counselling relationship 
from the “old hands” to the new arrivals. The more experienced members have few people to 
whom they can turn. 
 
Also, the latter are given to the biggest and most complex projects. The danger is that they 
become swamped in the number of tasks to be carried out, lost under a pile of documents 
connected to the project. Indeed, with the projects, a certain “bureaucratical accountability” is 
developing (Vaughan, 1999): everything has to be written, tracked and signed, which 
sometimes leads the older workers to neglect technical tasks (such as the second, informal 
opinion that they expressed on all plans in the past). 
 
This also leads to a change in the way regulations are obeyed. The more experienced 
workers, whilst recognising the importance of these rules – and traceability in particular –, do 
not have total confidence in them. They know how to get around them and make the most of 
their “practical” and “experienced-based” know-how (Vaughan, 1997), in particular given 
unexpected occurrences where formal documents do not serve much purpose. On the other 
hand, the younger workers seem to be very much attached to the regulations. Their 
philosophy is as follows: “if I respect the rules, I will have done my utmost to avoid an 
incident”. The same applies to test logs: the younger workers are incapable of referring to 
the electro-mechanical plans from which the test logs originate, and therefore are unarmed if 
mistakes have slipped into the trial logs. 
 
“The flip-side of this formalisation is that people tend to hide behind documents. I don’t want 
to seem like an old warrior, but not so long ago, we worked mostly on the plans and people 
perhaps visualised the diagrams better.” (Signalling engineer). 
 
Informal checking is therefore less systematic or less effective. The very thing that makes 
the team flexible and highly reliable is being challenged by the progressive diminishing of 
occupational competencies and all forms of redundancy. The team’s resilience is 
progressively declining. It would take just one major unexpected occurrence or exceptional 
workload for the team to start making mistakes and not be able to detect them. 
 
The excess of unexpected modification requests and their non-
negotiable nature resulted in fatigue for those who suffered them, 
which in turn made them less vigilant 
 
The foundations of resilience, according to Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) are a “developing 
mindfulness” and a “preoccupation with failure”. Within a project, this preoccupation must be 
shared by all teams, but it must also be part of the project piloting practices which need to be 
attentive to warning signs which come from the various teams. So, this party is specifically 
interested in the way the project team (automation engineers) organises and shares out the 
workload between the teams (signalling engineers). 
 
If we observe the many adjustments within the signalling engineering team, the same does 
not apply when we cross the “community of practice” border. Thus, between signalling 
engineering and the project team, negotiations, understandings - informal ones in particular -
seem no longer to exist. There is a fault line between signalling and project, which 
compromises cooperation between them.  
 
The data collected reveals that this absence of negotiation is partly due to competition 
between occupational territories. The introduction of new automation technology has led to a 
repositioning of the different professions. Indeed, in the previous technical system used to 
direct trains, signalling (electro-mechanical technology) was primarily responsible for 
averting major risks. Because of this, it had a central position within the overall system. With 
the onset of computerised systems, the automation engineers are now at the heart of the 
system. 
 
As part of the project, the different technical specialities must adapt to automation 
technologies and make modifications to their own specialities accordingly. Project 
management has been entrusted to the automation engineers, who consider the other 
specialised team as service-providers working at their behest, according to needs generated 
through the development of automation systems, and without too much concern for the 
availability of resources. 
 
At project level, between the automation engineers and other occupation groups, there is no 
regulation governing the number of requests, no negotiation on workload, no collective 
discussion on the best way of organising requests between them. The other groups are 
perceived by the automation engineers as the main causes of project delays and exert 
permanent pressure to ensure that their modification requests are processed. 
 
(Concerning signalling engineering verification practices) “It’s very slow, very slow. We go 
quicker than they do, they get us behind and that’s why the dates I’m giving you keep getting 
postponed” (automation engineer). 
 
And yet, as we saw previously, the prevention of risks by the signalling engineering team is 
based on various formal and informal redundancies. This practice is very sensitive to 
workload. The signalling engineers have to accept a work overload which will quickly erode 
the redundancies which, until now, guaranteed a high level of reliability (Wood, 2005).  
 
“The guys that manage the schedules sometimes try to put pressure on by saying “when are 
you going to check it ?, when are you going to check it ?”, and then, “go on then….when are 
you going to get down to it ?”, but what they mean is “so….the IT people are waiting for 
them, contractually we need to do it”, and the guys….I think they just feel great pressure… A 
bit of pressure is put on and that causes problems, because they want to shorten the 
schedules, and we don’t have the input documents and we’ve got all these procedures which 
mean that…. It’s just heavy going”. (signalling engineer) 
 
In principle, signalling engineering intervenes after control engineering on the basis of its 
specifications. However, on account of time constraints, operations can not be done 
sequentially: the signalling engineers have to anticipate and launch their studies with 
information and specifications which are often very approximate. They might make 
hypotheses on the way signalling will interface with new automation systems. However, 
these hypotheses are often called into question during the project, when knowledge on the 
automation part improves and the system evolves. This leads to constant returns to the 
design plans. But once launched, the signalling operations are very difficult to modify 
because each time, the whole dual verification process has to be re-done. 
 
“What I’m saying is that generally what happens is that the project team know what they 
want, but they don’t understand the constraints, so all these preliminary meetings which last 
over several years before we get any financing, are intended to wrap the project up in the 
finest detail… During this time, we have to work, but we still have no definitive solutions, let’s 
say. It sure gets very complicated.” (Signalling engineer) 
 
The signalling team then has to take unreasonable risks, for example by doing only partial 
dual verifications. Informal redundancy does not allow to compensate the one for the other, 
since each actor is focused on his part and doesn’t have the time to worry about what his 
colleague is doing.  
 
“No, but it all adds up, and it means we can’t work calmly and it just doesn’t help: the 
atmosphere is deteriorating. That’s clear. And then you’ve got pressure and nerves and 
there’s no way around it… someone who’s working so many hours at night, who doesn’t 
have much time to recuperate, at some point in time, if he’s working all alone, there’s a 
chance he is going to cock-up. Even for the schematic diagrams, we get to the crunch and 
we have to get documents together as quickly as we can and we do them as quickly as we 
can and they get handed in with loads of mistakes… that’s just not right!” (signalling 
engineer) 
 
Little by little, the adjustments are abandoned, whereas previously it was they that helped 
control risk, leading to a form of “organizational deviance” or “routine non-conformity” 
(Vaughan, 1999). This organisational deviance is produced or even encouraged by the 
organisation. The risks are perceived by the signalling engineers individually but they are not 
subject to a collective initiative. 
 
Contrary to automation systems, a new and innovatory technology and therefore destined to 
evolve over time, signalling is considered traditional technology which is therefore controlled 
whatever the context. Signalling engineers cannot make the project teams understand the 
difficulties that they have in completing their tasks, and the risks that they have to take. This 
creates demotivation. Their occupational ethic is profoundly linked with controlling railway 
safety. But in the organisational context described, they say that they can no longer 
guarantee safety. 
 
“What is getting really hard is this sort of political speak. In meetings, we say that security is 
the department’s number one priority, but if you don’t put the staff there to supervise the 
contractors, it just doesn’t add up.” (Signalling engineer) 
 
Furthermore, for the signalling engineers, the accumulation of modification requests raises 
questions. It is a fact that the difficulties encountered by the automation engineers to 
programme their new system and interface it with existing equipment leads to non-justified 
emergencies or repetitive modifications which are perceived as incoherent by the signalling 
engineers.  
 
“And sometimes we do stuff in a mad rush, but it turns out to be for nothing. Well, I say for 
nothing… We are asked to do it quickly and therefore we do it quickly and, at the end of the 
day, it’s used or it’s not used, but later….they’ve squeezed us and if we hadn’t done it so 
quickly, it would have been better.” (Signalling engineer) 
 
“To tell you the truth, I’ve already had cases where you have had to speed things up… We 
were getting the test logs a bit late, normally I think it’s 15 days minimum before the work 
begins, and sometimes we get them less than a week before. It’s very commonplace, 
especially with small projects”. (Signalling engineer) 
 
The pressure exerted by the project managers on the signalling engineers, the many and 
incoherent requests bring about a sort of weariness and a feeling that the security issue is 
not really shared within the organisation, and with that comes a degree of demotivation. This 
demotivation makes people less vigilant, both individually and collectively. Everybody goes 
into their corner and experience-sharing and problem-sharing, previously the real strength of 
the signalling team, become difficult. 
 
The technological modernisation introduces new risk assessment 
and prevention techniques which worsen competition between 
occupational groups 
 
Beyond tensions associated with project organisation, the survey looked at risk assessment 
and control techniques which have also changed dramatically with automation.  
 
Until now, signalling technologies were at the heart of collision prevention. With automation, 
it is the IT system which is progressively taking collision prevention in hand. The computer 
system is tagged onto existing signalling equipment which provides information on train 
positions. In other words, in order to be perfectly reliable, the system must now combine 
three checks: proper functioning of signalling equipment already in place, the interface 
between signalling equipment and automation and the automation system itself. We have 
moved from a situation where the signalling engineers were the main actors in risk 
prevention to a situation where the responsibility is shared between automation engineers 
and signalling engineers. Let us examine in more detail the practices upon which risk 
prevention is based. 
 
On the signalling engineers side, risk control is primarily based on the rigorous application of 
formalised design rules. There is no real prior risk analysis (in the AMDEC or operational 
security sense of the term): the risks are primarily identified on the ground, near to the 
equipment and in a very practical way. Designers, developers and checkers must adapt to 
the variable nature of situations and equipment in place (their ageing, etc…). The “subject 
matter”, the “technical object” in its “resistance” to human logic played a vital role here and 
many problems were solved on the ground and working with cables.  
 
On the automation system side on the other hand, all safety analyses and all tests are 
carried out upstream, before they are actually installed on-site and, more often than not, 
using formal methods and simulator tests. On-site, the tests on the automation elements are 
monitored by supervisors. If the tests are not compliant with their test logs, they must 
attempt nothing on-site: in fact, they are not asked to think about the causes of these non-
conformities. They just look at their results: it is up to the engineers to analyse them and to 
decide on any corrective action on the software. 
 
So, the field phase during which the equipment is physically installed, is much less critical in 
automation systems than in signalling. On the software side, the tests carried out upstream 
during design ensure that the system is reliable: it is at this moment that the reliability of the 
software has to be checked. Once installed, improper cabling cannot lead to non-safety 
problems. In signalling engineering, on the other hand, the field phase is really critical: a 
single bad connection can trigger a non-safety incident. 
 
“In signalling, it’s very delicate, because you have only got yourself to blame. There is no 
system above. We are in a signal box and it’s completely autonomous. If you get it wrong, 
there’s no system above us which will necessarily pick up the mistake. Whilst the software, 
with all the loops and redundancies built in, safety is more diffuse” (automation engineer). 
 
The different interpretations of risk control crystallise the conflicts or at least the splits 
between these occupational groups. Signalling engineers practice is not understood by the 
automation engineers who criticise their deadlines and verification procedures. 
 
“The problem with signalling engineering is that you have a specifier, a specification verifier, 
a designer, a design verifier, an implementer, an implementation verifier… So, to make a 
modification, it takes more or less a year. So, imagine the case of [this project] where there 
are several hundred modifications! We know it’s the key to success” (automation engineers). 
 
With automation, a new form of risk has arisen: risks of technical incoherence and in 
particular with the interfaces between the automatic system and existing signalling 
equipment. These new risks are the subject of real concern both for automation engineers 
and signalling engineers.  
 
Numerous modifications resulting from automation engineers’ demands mean that the 
signalling team has completely lost its overall vision of operations required of it, in particular 
the sequential splitting of modifications into more than one night. For example, an operation 
which was to be carried out one night may be cut up at the request of the project into two 
because further tasks have been added in the meantime. 
 
Furthermore, signalling engineers reject the “traditional technology” label that the automation 
engineers give them: the environment in which signalling operates has become so complex 
that their operations cannot be qualified as “traditional” and “controlled”. The signalling 
engineers now have to deal with technologies that they do not understand. 
 
“We are taking new IT systems on board…and we say, well signalling…we know that, so it’s 
not a problem. Except that signalling is understood in a given environment, but that 
environment is changing. And these environments… when we are reasoning no longer in 
signalling sub-systems but in overall systems, these other sub-systems have a direct impact 
on signalling and its functioning and there we have no experience…” (Signalling engineer) 
 
“Currently, we are creating new stuff in signalling which has never been tried and tested 
which means we have no absolute guarantee on functional and safety aspects. But our 
bosses continue to consider that signalling is something that is known and controlled and 
that the guys know how it works. No, I’m sorry, we have changed environment and we are in 
the process of reinventing elements of signalling…and there, there is a real risk. And what’s 
sure is that they don’t understand that today. They just don’t understand”. (Signalling 
engineer) 
 
The automation engineers on the other hand, criticise the signalling engineers for not taking 
an interest in new system risks, but focusing only on risks that are inherent to signalling, and 
by extension, on their risk-prevention methods. 
 
“When they (the signalling engineers) validate their diagrams and all that, they’re not worried 
at all about system safety, they’re worried about obeying the rules listed in the signalling 
instructions and that’s all. And so the safety of the whole is based on the analyses of these 
instructions upstream. It is upstream that we need to take a hold of it because after, it is too 
late, and it takes time”. (Automation engineers) 
 
In fact, these different interpretations of risk control reflect tensions between these 
“occupational groups” (Bechky, 2003). In the medium term, the signalling engineers are in 
danger of losing the “noble” part of their profession. As a project manager confided to us, 
“the signalling engineers remind me of the Gauls in the Roman Empire”. This metaphor 
perfectly illustrates what is going on between the two groups: the Gauls are indeed seen as 
an archaic community which are using old, or even obsolete, tools. The Romans are 
modernity, but also the invaders coming to conquer the Gauls’ land. In keeping with the 
metaphor, the signalling engineers are there to resist the automation system “invaders”.  
 
One of the reasons that there is not really any shared representation of operations and 
therefore of risks, is that errors and difficulties encountered by signalling engineers are rarely 
fed back or discussed. Between the different occupational groups there is “structural 
secrecy”, a concept that Vaughan (1988) uses to understand why organisational deviance in 
a given group is not perceived by anyone outside the group. Secrecy is induced by the very 
structure of the organisation: division of work, hierarchy and physical distance segmentalise 
knowledge about objectives and tasks and make the actions of one part invisible from the 
other. Like the Gauls, the signalling engineers go off into their occupational corner and 
exchange less and less information with those from outside the group, and continue to 
pursue their own objectives (Metiu, 2004). 
 
This is also explained by the rivalries between occupational groups, and more precisely 
between the group which delegates risk (here, the automation engineers) and that which 
actually takes that risk (the signalling engineering). He who delegates risk will also be quick 
to accuse the other group in case of mistakes. An informal standard within the colleague 
group will then come into being for fear that errors may be used by the others: errors are 
only discussed in your own occupational group because “the colleague group would 
consider that it alone fully understands the technical contingencies and that it should 
therefore be given the sole right to say when a mistake has been made” (Hughes, 1951). Of 
course, this creates opacity, which is primarily based on “the feeling that outsiders will never 
understand the full context of risk and contingency that makes colleagues so tight-lipped”. 
 
So, the modernisation of equipment leads to a wholly paradoxical situation: occupation 
rivalry, exacerbated by different risk assessment practices, does not help us to understand 
new risks induced by technological hybridation. There is no “collective state of awareness” 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001), which limits “continuous adjustments that prevent errors form 
accumulating and enlarging”. Each party has its own interpretation of risks, and the most 
appropriate means to control them, and ignores the particular situation of other actors 
involved in the project. Concerns are not shared between teams and each focuses on its 
own turf. 
 
 
 Reaction to incidents, in a tense atmosphere between occupational 
groups, increases organisational rigidity 
 
Incidents observed (as described above) have really raised awareness amongst signalling 
engineers as to the shortcomings of risk control. This awareness has resulted in substantial 
investment in formalising feedback, detailing technical causes, errors and organisational 
causes. We wondered whether this awareness had only affected signalling engineers or 
whether it had affected the project as a whole. In other words, does this project organisation 
show any real capacity to manage its errors (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001) beyond its internal 
occupational boundaries ? 
 
The interviews we carried out with signalling engineers revealed an occupational community 
that has been severely shaken, and where the dominant feeling is one of fear. 
 
“Personally, that’s what really got to me... retrospective fear. Because there, we focus on this 
incident, but we fiddle with the whole of the line and when we make modifications, it’s like 
that all the way down the line! You should see some workstations. It’s amazing what’s going 
on. So things like that… we’ve got dozens and dozens all the time… is what shocks people, 
retrospective fear, fear that one day, we’ll miss something which has some nasty 
consequences” (signalling engineer). 
 
All of them had a sharp sense of the risks they were running, but also of the risks for projects 
and especially for future users. Incident cause analysis established limits to current practices 
within the signalling team, both in terms of test procedures and design verification. 
 
“These trials are based on the competencies of the agents. After every operation, the 
workers wait for the first two trains to come through in each direction (in compliance with 
prevailing regulations).” (feedback). 
 
“The trial log described the test for modifications on circuit number 1, but not modifications to 
the other circuits. The impact on the other circuits was not shown either during the trial log 
draft, nor during verifications, nor during field trials”. (feedback). 
 
However, dysfunction cause analysis also pointed to project piloting, in particular the rate at 
which modification demands arrived and the deadlines imposed… 
 
“This operation has been subject to successes modifications (studies completely reworked) 
at the request of the project. Respecting an evolving, tight schedule means slicing up 
interventions and increasing risks”. (feedback) 
 
Successive delays in functional specifications at system level (automations) generate 
multiple phasings which require successive and partial reworks on studies that have already 
been done globally, to carry out trials in a context where pressure is on in terms of 
schedule”. (feedback) 
 
When we talked to the project teams, on the contrary, we were struck by the little concern 
that these actors showed for such events: either they had never heard of them, or they had 
interpreted them as having no relationship with the project, except in a sense that they might 
delay it. In other words, the feedback which was limited to the signalling engineers’ team did 
not lead to their questioning project management more globally. 
 
Thus, the incidents were perceived very differently by the signalling team and the project 
team. These incidents are a strong indication for signalling engineers which show that time 
pressure and shifting constraints lead to dangerous situations. And this signal (Vaughan, 
1997) was not heard or taken into account by the project teams which made no modification 
to their working methods. 
 
Faced with this situation, the signalling engineering management team saw no other 
alternative to attempt to maintain safety and get the project teams to take their constraints 
into account than making their organisation more rigid through formalisation. 
 
So, the signalling team made a choice of controlling their internal control and redundancy 
rules more strictly so as to avoid being confronted again with a situation where they may find 
themselves being held responsible. New procedures, such as impact analyses, were even 
created, which sought to analyse all the risks associated with a new modification, and 
tracking them.  
 
The workers therefore did not deviate from the formal dual verification process. Further to 
the incidents, they collectively decided to abandon informal night verification and no longer 
to work under emergency conditions. They will no longer compromise to guarantee the 
delays at just any cost. 
 
“We don’t work last minute in this area, or….I should say, now I refuse to. I have always tried 
to get stuff out in time. Given what happened recently, I’m taking my time. It was a real 
wake-up call !” (signalling engineering) 
 
They cite respect for the dual verification procedure (and the associated regulatory 
verification times) to justify any delays, and through this, try to reduce the number of 
modifications which progressively added to their workload. 
 
Rigidification of design and verification practices is not without impact on the project: longer 
deadlines, worsening of the conflict between the project team and the signalling team, no in-
depth dialogue on the risks of the new socio-technical system, etc… Negotiation with the 
project teams, in particular on resources, has not got any better. The question of deadlines is 
even more thorny and more inclined to worsen the conflicts than help to resolve them. 
 
Recourse to strict application of procedures leads to rigidification. And rigidity can harm 
resilience (Woods, 2006), in the sense that it reduces a system’s capacity to face up to 
unplanned events and to bounce back when under pressure: “rules – and whether to obey 
them or not – are part of an organisation’s culture. Organisations create rules to ensure 
safety. But in practice, the rules themselves may create additional risks” (Vaughan, 1997). 
 
Also, this strict respect for procedures leads to isolation of the different actors: there is less 
sharing of experience and the workers increasingly face problems alone. 
 
Discussion 
 
Our in-depth analysis took a new look at the organisational conditions of resilience in 
automation projects of a highly reliable technological system. Adding new technologies to 
existing ones generates numerous unanticipated modifications and the highly integrated 
nature of these technical systems makes the propagation of modifications worse. 
Furthermore,: “large accidents were in plants with high complexity and tight coupling and 
these characteristics were apparently heightened as a result of incremental growth through 
add-ons and technology patches to older systems” (Perrow, 1999, Wolf and Berniker, 1999). 
In such a context, guaranteeing a high level of reliability is especially difficult and requires 
particularly “resilient” project organisation (Wood, 2005). 
 
This case re-visits the organisational conditions of the resilience of such a project. First of all, 
it shows how, within a single community of practices - here signalling engineering - there is a 
fairly high resilience based on extensive social and epistemic cohesion. More detailed 
analysis nevertheless showed several latent sources (Perrow, 1996) of non-reliability, and 
greater division of work within the teams, with insufficient competence overlap. 
 
By taking interest in interactions between teams within the project, our study shows that 
there are discontinuities between “communities of practices” (Mork and ali, 2008) which do 
not encourage coordination (Carlile, 2004). The existence of very specialised occupational 
groups in their technical areas is in opposition to one of the conditions of resilience: the 
redistribution of technical competencies in the organisation (Kendra and Wachtendorf, 
2003). 
 
Furthermore, because it redefines occupational territories (Abbott, 1988; Mork and ali, 2008; 
Bechky, 2002), questions roles, identities and status of certain groups within the organisation 
(Metiu, 2004), the automation project is challenged by deliberate obstacles to cooperation 
(development of opacity), “obstacles” to the management of unforeseen events, and an 
absence of informal regulation between the different teams. Low cooperation limits 
capacities for forward planning, perception and reaction to variations (Hollnagel, Leveson 
and Woods, 2005). 
 
Tensions affect risk assessment directly: “divergence is aggravated if different parties also 
have different knowledge and perceptions of the nature of sources of uncertainty and 
different capabilities for managing them” (Atkinson et al., 2006). We observe divergence in 
the interpretation of events which do not encourage collaborative action (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2001). In such a conflictual context, piloting projects is to do with “classic command and 
control bureaucracy” described by Weick and Sutcliffe (2001), “that is adequate for a stable 
world, but too inflexible in times of change”.  
 
So, all it took was for the workload to increase on the signalling engineering teams for the 
usual verifications to fall away. Internal flexibility of these teams ended up turning against 
them because of a lack of redundant resources, “organisational slack” (Wood, 2005): the 
pressure exerted on them encouraged them to take excessive risks whilst they had been 
rendered more vulnerable in other areas.  
 
For Perrow (1999) for example, “decentralized units are better able to handle the continual 
stream of small failures, forestalling the widespread, multiple failures”. 
 
Continuing with the metaphor of the reed allows us to discuss the notion of resilience. We 
can imagine that the project organisation, like the structure of the reed, comprises zones of 
variable rigidity and variable fragility. In the same way that the strength of the wind hits the 
reed, the uncertainties of project management bear forces on the social organisation of the 
project, which are propagated by adjustments and which sometimes accumulate and lead to 
more pronounced distortion on certain teams from within the project. Some parts of the 
organisation, because they are more flexible than others, because they have less power 
than others, concentrate the pressure resulting from these uncertainties. These teams can 
have a certain capacity to manage contradictory demands, but an excess may result in them 
making errors. Resilience does not apply to the project as a whole.   
 
The flexibility of part of the organisation maintains the illusion of resilience. Flexibility, the 
capacity to improvise, redefine roles, immediately correct errors and learn from them, 
sharing experiences and collective anticipation (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) do not work for the 
project as a whole. They are concentrated in those areas where constraints accumulate and 
the divide generated by the difficult combination between the rigidity of certain elements and 
the flexibility of others constitute a major risk factor. A resilient organisation is not an 
organisation which prevents adjustments but an organisation which can identify the 
circulation of adjustments within it, regulate that circulation, avoid substantial imbalance and 
ensure that the different links of the chain are capable of dealing with them.   
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